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 Abstract 
 
Research suggests that decision-makers often use demographic characteristics for 
the purpose of influencing the sanctioning strategy allocated.  The research study 
examines the extent to which the sanctioning strategies allocated are influenced by race 
and gender.  The research is based on data gathered from Jefferson Parish Juvenile 
Services Department of Probation used to examine how race and gender influence 
juvenile sanctioning strategy allocation.  The results from the discriminant analysis offers 
support for the argument that due to stereotypical perceptions on the part of decision 
makers, members of minority groups, in particular females may receive differential 
treatment than their white male counterparts.  Implications of the results, as well as 
suggestions for future research are discussed.  
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 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Although previous research studies have addressed the issue of race and gender 
discrimination in the juvenile justice system, this thesis examines if there is race or 
gender discrimination in allocation of juvenile offenders to sanction strategies.  The 
existing literature on juvenile offenders is deficient because previous authors have failed 
to identify how race and gender influence the sanctioning strategy allocated.  Numerous 
studies have explored the success of sanctioning strategy; few identify the effect of 
demographic characteristics that may influence sanctioning strategy allocation.  Studies 
have also failed to examine the influence of class status on the sanctioning strategy.  
Because past studies have overlooked why juveniles are sanctioned to detention as 
opposed to electronic monitoring, this study will include juvenile offenders in detention 
and analyze its causes. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of various variables on the 
fairness of electronic monitoring and detention.  Personal demographics about the 
juvenile offender and extralegal factors are divided into different categories (race, gender, 
age, seriousness of offense, and length of sentence served).    Examination of the personal 
information of juvenile offenders is important to this study because it is hoped it will be 
possible to identify factors contributing to significant differences in sanction strategy 
allocated. Discriminant analysis will be used to identify which variables are most 
strongly associated with sanction allocated.   
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 Significance of the Study 
The study seeks to increase attention to the supervision and treatment of juvenile 
offenders in the community so that adequate data will be developed to support alternative 
sanctions for juvenile. In particular, this inquiry examines if there are race and gender 
differences in allocation of electronic monitoring and detention for juvenile offenders.   
 This study contributes to the literature concerning racial and gender differences in 
the juvenile justice system.  More research about racial differences in sanctioning 
juveniles is needed, especially now that the federal government is monitoring these 
decisions to ensure that racial discrimination no longer occurs.  The results of this study 
will show if this jurisdiction is complying in this one decision.  In addition, there is very 
little research about the effect of gender on sanctioning strategies and much of it is out-
of-date.  This study will add to the literature. 
 Thus, if the results of this study show that race significantly affects the sanction, 
then there is evidence that federal monitoring of sanctioning decisions is not adequate to 
obtain compliance and the government must increase its monitoring efforts.  Moreover, if 
the results demonstrate that gender significantly affects the sanction, this outcome would 
suggest that the government should also attempt to force the end of gender discrimination 
in the juvenile justice system and monitor the decisions in the system for this type of 
discrimination as well.  This would be especially true if the result is that females get 
harsher sanctions since females in general are less serious and less frequent offenders 
than males.  In summary, the system needs to examine its decisions at every stage since 
discrimination cannot be stopped if it is not even recognized. 
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 Literature Review 
Discussion of Electronic Monitoring & Detention 
 When juvenile offenders violate their terms of probation they are sanctioned to 
specialized sanctioning programs.   The specialized sanctioning programs are intended to 
allow more rational allocation of correctional and sanctioning resources to safely 
supervise minor offenders in community programs while confining serious offenders to 
imprisonment. Specialized sanctioning programs include: (1) juvenile detention, the 
temporary and safe custody of juveniles accused of conduct subject to the jurisdiction of 
the court, and (2) electronic monitoring, which allows offenders sentenced to probation to 
remain in the community on the condition that they stay at home during specific periods 
of time.  The juveniles are placed on the sanction strategy based on the severity of the 
offense and risk of future recidivism.  For example, a first time offender who committed 
a crime against person would be recommended for detention.   
 An electronic monitor is worn the juvenile offender emits a signal indicating the 
offender’s whereabouts and alert authorities when the offender left his or her premises.  
Primarily, low-risk offenders who violate their terms of probation are sanctioned to 
electronic monitoring (Bonta et al 2000).  Usually, the offenders sanctioned to electronic 
monitoring represent a group who could be safely managed in the community. 
 In contrast, youth sanctioned to detention are usually your medium- risk or 
high-risk offenders.  The juvenile offenders are confined to a physically restricting 
environment that exposes them to a “prison.” 
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 Previous Research on Sanctioning Strategies     
 Advocates of electronic monitoring and juvenile detention both praise the 
community treatment principles, which include community protection, accountability, 
competency, individualization, and balance. In addition, electronic monitoring and 
detention are more restrictive than routine probation so it may better address the 
community needs for punishment.  Also, electronic monitoring and detention provides an 
opportunity to rehabilitate offenders.  Assessment of electronic monitoring and detention 
shows recidivism rates are about the same compared to other programs (Siegel & Sienna 
1997).  
 At the outset, electronic monitoring is a "graduated sanctions" model based upon 
a youth's performance while on probation. Electronic monitoring offers a concrete 
support system to achieve the goals of reducing the number of juvenile offenders held in 
secure detention and to prevent recidivism.  For example, Charles (1989) proclaims 
offenders are monitored who would otherwise have been incarcerated.  Electronic 
monitors offer more individualized treatment, are responsive to local and offender needs, 
and provide an alternative to incarceration for non-violent pre and post-adjudicated 
offenders, thereby alleviating overcrowded juvenile correctional facilities.  Therefore, 
electronic monitoring can be used to save money and limit incarceration without 
sacrificing community safety.   
Support for electronic monitors may be found in the literature. The greatest 
benefit of electronic monitoring is its lower cost and its ability to be used as a community 
based intermediate sanction in which treatment services can be delivered.  In addition, 
electronic monitoring reduces the number of days juveniles spend in detention.  Also, 
 4
 electronic monitoring allows juveniles who would otherwise be detained to remain in the 
home with supervision.  Furthermore, because juveniles are monitored by electronic 
devices, fewer supervision officers are needed.    
 However, there are general criticisms of electronic monitoring including it being 
issued to serious offenders, faulty equipment, a lack of rehabilitative services, 
infringement on privacy, increased costs, and net widening. Net widening is the 
phenomenon that occurs when the overall juvenile justice population is increased due to 
programs intended to divert lower-risk youth actually enmeshes the juvenile more deeply 
into the juvenile justice system. For example, Charles (1989) states if net widening 
occurs, electronic monitoring can increase correctional costs, especially if it becomes an 
additional condition of the probation program.  More importantly, if net widening occurs, 
electronic monitoring could incur greater costs due to technical violations or new 
criminal activity.   Consequently, the electronic monitor which was intended to 
rehabilitate and punish lower-risk youth who violated the terms of their probation may 
eventually lead to more criminality.  Another setback is that close surveillance may 
unleash new technical violations at higher rates. Rather than reducing the number of 
youth formally processed through the juvenile justice system, close surveillance may 
result in more juveniles placed in the juvenile justice system. Additionally, judges may 
misuse electronic monitoring as a sanctioning method by issuing it to more serious 
offenders to save tax money or prison beds because they might feel that prison is too 
severe.   
Annesley Schmidt (1998) focuses on the use of electronic monitoring as a tool for 
criminal justice.  Schmidt found several disadvantages of electronic monitoring, ranging 
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 from proper selection and assignment of offenders to appropriate sanctions, unrealistic 
expectations, and technology replacing human beings, widening social controls, and net 
widening. That is, offenders are being sanctioned on lower levels, and a primary focus is 
on offender surveillance. In reference to participant selection, there is a race bias when 
admitting those juveniles who qualify for electronic monitoring.  There is also gender 
bias in that females with more serious offenses may not be viewed as a threat to their 
communities so they are issued electronic monitoring which could compromise of public 
safety.   
Roy Sudipto (qtd. in Schmidt 12) compares adult and juvenile offenders 
sentenced to electronically monitored home detention, paying special attention to the two 
groups' rates of failure to complete those sentences. Eligibility for the home detention 
program relies on whether there is strong family support, whether the crime committed 
was nonviolent, and if the candidate is employed or currently attending school. When 
comparing failure rates of juveniles and adults, the factors most relevant to differences 
were race, current offense, substance abuse history, most recent prior offenses, and 
sentence length.  Based on the findings, Sudipto concluded that among juveniles, current 
offense, substance abuse, and repeat offenders were most likely to fail.  Sentence length 
also predicted failure; the longer the sentence, the more likely the failure.   
 Advocates of detention assert detention is a short and intense period of retributive 
punishment that may be successful in transforming and reforming offenders and 
subsequently reducing recidivism. Juvenile detention facilities provide restrictive custody 
through staff monitoring, locked entrances and exits, and interior fence controls. 
Specifically, a juvenile may be placed in detention if they have violated their terms of 
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 probation and the probationer poses a threat to the public or themselves.   In addition, 
juvenile detention facilities are essential in reducing the number of incarcerated youth.  
Detention may be used as a sanction because detention may offer some help and 
treatment, and a strategy to gain a juvenile’s attention before giving them a stiffer 
penalty.  According to the Annie E. Casey Foundation, this practice reflects the belief 
that juvenile offenders can be shocked into behavior and that a stay in detention will give 
them a “taste of the system” (Roush 2000 247).  This is a tactic of “Scared Straight”.   
Roush (2000) finds this “Scared Straight” approach is problematic because more 
delinquency is created for detention programs and staff due to the increase in offense 
seriousness, lengths of stay, and age of offender.     
Prior literature suggests detention as a short-term punishment is less effective than 
other sanction strategies in practice as a threat.  Juvenile offenders may adapt to the 
regimen of detention, so any “taste of the system” wears off after a day or so of their 
initial stay. Detention as a sanction challenges the temporary element in the definition by 
increasing the length of stay.   Federle and Lind (1992) suggest the number of youth 
confined in secure detention facilities can be considerably reduced without jeopardizing 
community safety.  As a result of overcrowding, violent offenders are placed in the same 
facility with nonviolent offenders.  For these reasons, “the National Juvenile Detention 
Association is opposed to juvenile detention as a sanction,” (Roush 2000 248). 
The purpose of sanctioning is to protect the community from delinquency by 
imposing accountability for offenses committed as well as to equip juvenile offenders 
with the required competencies to live productively and responsibly in the community. 
The most basic and important goal of sanctioning is to safeguard the public interest by 
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 deterring juvenile offenders from repeating their illegal and socially unacceptable 
behavior.  Proponents of sanctions share the following arguments: (1) juveniles 
committing new offenses or reoffending can be quickly hauled back into juvenile court 
for more intensive and intrusive interventions, (2) sanctioning is a moderately effective 
method of controlling the illegal behavior of moderately delinquent juveniles including 
those involved in person oriented offenses, (3) sanctioning advances balanced 
rehabilitation while accommodating demands for legal controls and public protection, 
and (4) most sanctioned juvenile offenders respond with less delinquency.  
In sum, both electronic monitoring programs and juvenile detention are designed 
to ensure community safety and reduce cost. Electronic monitoring is advantageous in 
that it allows less serious offenders to remain in their community and allow them to stay 
in school, maintain family attachments, and their own level of independence.  Several 
factors are attributed to the possible success of the sanction, such as the careful selection 
of program participants, the goal of the program, and the juveniles’ fear of imprisonment 
if they violate the terms of their sanction. Despite these factors, some stakeholders are 
still willing to risk the safety of the juvenile or to make recommendations which were 
professionally incorrect simply to save money. More importantly, sanctions that involve 
an appropriate treatment component should be more effective at reducing recidivism than 
incarceration for many offenders. 
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 Theory  
With respect to examining race and gender discrimination in sanction assignment, 
radical-conflict theory outlines problems of power and inequality that are thought to 
contribute to social environments favored by a ruling class.  Radical-conflict theory 
developed from the writings of Karl Marx, and was tailored to examine crime by Jeffrey 
Reiman (1996) and Richard Quinney (1985) to study how the politically and 
economically powerful use their position to defuse threat and secure legitimacy of their 
position.    Central to radical-conflict theory is the idea of capitalism creating a class 
struggle between the elite and the lower class, with crime as one consequence of that 
struggle. 
Radical-conflict theory examines how the criminal justice system enforces laws 
that impose standards of morality and good behavior created in the interest of the ruling 
class on individual wrongdoers.  Crime divides society into two opposing social groups, 
noncriminal composed of the “decent middle Americans” and the criminal composed of 
the individuals who are poor or of weak character. The criminal laws generate conflict, 
hostility, and bias against minorities and groups below the middle class on “the economic 
ladder” (Reiman 1998 149). Consequently, the middle class sides with the elites, thinking 
crime is the work of a dangerous lower class.    
 Richard Quinney (1985) contributed to radical-conflict theory by indicating six 
central ideas to the social reality of crime, which describe the basic reasons for criminal 
behavior in a society at a given time. First, crime is a definition of human conduct that is 
created by authorized agents in a politically organized society. Second, criminal 
definitions describe behaviors that conflict with the interests of those segments of society 
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 which have the power to translate their interest into policy.  Third, criminal definitions 
are applied by the segments of society that have the power to shape the enforcement and 
administration of criminal law.  Fourth, behavior patterns are structured in segmentally 
organized society in relation to criminal definitions, and within this context persons 
engage in actions that have relative probabilities of being defined as criminal.  Fifth, 
conceptions of crime are constructed and diffused in the segments of society by various 
means of communication.  Sixth, the social reality of crime is constructed by the 
formulation and application of criminal definitions, the development of behavior patterns 
related to criminal definitions, and the construction of criminal conceptions.   
 Essentially, the definition of crime is an implicit judgment of behaviors that is 
formulated by the ruling elite and is taught to members of society.  The ruling elite decide 
what and who is criminal.  The definition of crime creates havoc by criminalizing more 
behaviors of the nondominant class that are perceived as threats to the ruling class (e.g.  
girls running away from home, youth being labeled ungovernable, and drugs used by 
minorities).  As a result of the criminal definition, there is more class conflict because of 
a person’s position in political/economic structure. 
 Criminal definitions are based on the social order of the elite who have the power 
to make criminal laws that maintain established social institutions and economic order.  
By way of criminal laws, the elite are able to control the behavior of people who are 
oppressed by the modern capitalist political and economic system and are virtually 
powerless (workers, lower class, etc.). Although the elite (the ruling class) commit crimes 
of control, crimes of economic domination, and crimes of government, the criminal laws 
and procedures protect the ruling class from penalty.  Laws are primarily enforced against 
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 the lower class. For example, when a juvenile is sanctioned, the juvenile justice system 
acquits society of its responsibilities to the juveniles and solely blames the juvenile 
offender by claiming that criminal laws are minimum neutral ground rules.  Actions show 
how the members of oppressed groups are virtually controlled by the criminal justice 
system. 
 Application of criminal definitions refers to the interests of the elite placed into 
effect, and those who do not follow the law are perceived to be members of a deviant or 
minority group trying to gain power.    In other words, the court officials put in effect 
laws that reflect the ideology of the middle and upper classes and any one who does not 
follow the law is criminal or delinquent.    Crime and delinquency are a response of the 
minority groups trying to escape their class, gender, and racial inequalities produced by 
capitalistic motivations. 
 The development of behavior patterns in relation to criminal definitions refers to 
individuals in the minority sectors of society who were not represented in the creation 
and application of criminal definitions.  They are more likely to be perceived as a 
criminal than people who belong to the white, middle to upper class social structure.  
Individuals oppressed by the system, especially the working class, the poor, and racial 
and ethnic minorities may participate in crime due to the fewer legitimate opportunities 
available. Construction of criminal conceptions suggests that the law is a principle tool of 
used to defend the struggle between social groups and control the lower class.   In sum, 
the social reality of crime refers to a theory that describes and explains the amount and 
character of crime in a society at a given time. 
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 Discussion of Theory Relating to Race, Gender, and Sanctioning strategies 
Race, gender, and power are at the core of the radical-conflict perspective.    In 
terms of the sanction decision, many of the court officials are limited to a traditional 
Eurocentric, male interpretation of the law resulting in discrimination on the basis of race 
and gender.    Also, the court officials’ personal biases and possible ethnocentric attitudes 
may influence the sanction decision instead of legal variables such as seriousness of 
offense.  In other words, the court official may inappropriately select a sanction strategy 
due to stereotypical beliefs. Consequently, the patriarchal juvenile justice system may 
inadvertently reinforce punishment of juvenile offenders who belong to a minority group 
more severely than white males because they perceive minorities as more threatening, 
and therefore more deserving of punishment and control (Bridges and Steen 1998 556). 
As a result of subtle forms of sexism or racism, the court officials’ sanction decisions 
favor the white male juvenile offender and sustain multiple oppressions for the nonwhite 
male and female juvenile offenders.   
Radical feminists believe gender inequality stems from the unequal power of men 
and women and the subsequent exploitation of women by men.  Radical-feminist 
delinquency theory has challenged the male-oriented assumptions regarding what 
constitutes female delinquency and raised some critical questions:   Why are females 
sanctioned more leniently than males for index crimes (robbery and aggravated assault) 
but more harshly for nonindex crimes (especially running away and incorrigibility)?  Can 
theories developed by white males from Western cultures to address male criminal 
behavior appropriately address female delinquency?   
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 Radical feminist theorists address the roles that both women and men have been 
socialized to accept.  The theorists assert females are limited to gender-roles constraints 
and attitudes from their early socialization and how these may affect their sanction 
decision.  For instance, the juvenile justice official may be more likely to sanction the 
female offender to detention because her alleged sexual behavior violates the court 
officials’ stereotype of the young female. Nagal and Hanan argue that the sex-role 
attitudes of appropriate behavior for males and females cause both the more lenient and 
more severe sanctioning strategies females are issued (qtd in Kruttschnitt and Green 2003 
541).   
The radical-conflict feminist theorists emphasize the oppression of women is 
embedded in patriarchy and the power difference between men and women in American 
society.    Based on the unequal power of men and women, the juvenile court reinforces 
submissive and self-sacrificing behaviors in the female offender, by limiting access to 
privilege and power to act paternally to the young females.   The relationship between the 
juvenile offender and the juvenile court is hierarchical, with the court official in the 
power position, sanction decisions are viewed as a means of maintaining the oppressive 
status quo.   Siegel and Senna (1997) state “women are inherently powerless in such a 
male-dominated society; their crimes reflect the limitations they have for both legitimate 
and illegitimate opportunity” (Siegel and Senna 265).    For example, females are 
confined to detention for committing a nonindex offense because the criminal justice 
system wants to protect them from social evil, by presenting females with behavior 
models that will help them conform to normative society.  Chesney-Lind and Shelden 
(2004) noted in 1999 that 8% of females compared to 2% of males were being held in 
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 detention for status offenses.  Also, 30% of girls were held in detention for technical 
violations, compared with 21% for males.   Worth mentioning, females were less likely 
than males to be sanctioned to detention for index crimes against property and index 
crimes against persons. 
Instead of basing the sanction strategy decision principally on seriousness of 
offense, race, gender, and/or age, the court officials should examine the environmental 
factors that may contribute to the juvenile offender engaging in delinquency.  
Furthermore, the court official should understand the impact of gender and cultural 
factors on making the sanction strategy decision.  The court officials should be made 
aware of the roles males and females are taught. 
   A main criticism of radical-conflict theory is it overgeneralizes White male 
delinquency to fit delinquency of all.   Also, viewing the source of the sanction strategy 
decision in discrimination may actually contribute to the juvenile offender not accepting 
responsibility for their actions.  Furthermore, radical-conflict theory overlooks women of 
color and assumes race is not as crucial as gender in understanding discrimination in 
disposition decisions. Thus, radical-conflict theory should further address access to power 
and work towards becoming a more inclusive theory. 
Previous Research on Personal Demographics and Sanctioning Strategy 
Several studies have explored racial and gender bias in sanctioning of juvenile 
offenders throughout the juvenile justice system.   Research regarding whether there are 
race and gender differences in sanction strategy is important because knowing whether 
discriminatory practices exist will generate information about the most suitable 
sanctioning strategies to effectively and supportively supervise, protect, and treat juvenile 
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 offenders. This section will detail research on the variables that may influence sanction 
strategy.            
Quite a few studies have focused on the role of race on the sanctioning decision in 
the juvenile court.  First, Patricia Devine (1998) examined how African-Americans are 
significantly over-represented at all stages of the juvenile justice system.  Devine found 
although African-American youth comprise only 15% of the United States population 
aged ten to seventeen, they represent 30% of all juvenile arrests, 62% of the known 
violent offenses committed by juveniles, 33% of the total adjudicated juvenile arrests, 
45% youth in detention facilities, 46% of youth in long-term public institutions, and 52% 
of juvenile cases waived to adult criminal court.   Devine suggested African-Americans 
are denied opportunities due to discriminatory practices and capitalistic motivations, 
resulting in greater involvement of African-Americans in juvenile crime.  The capitalistic 
system makes it difficult for minority youth to enter the job market.  For example, 
African-American youth who are unemployed may use delinquency to interact with peers 
and become part of the capitalistic society because their parents may not be able to 
provide them with the money to partake in their leisure lifestyle. Further, when 
disproportionate minority confinement occurs it is simply a result of differential actions 
of minority youth such as minority youth facing higher probabilities of being arrested by 
the police.  This arrest is due to minority youth perceived as more delinquent because 
they visibly engage in open disputes with the police who may view them as violent and 
threatening.    Devine devised a plausible solution to disproportionate minority 
confinement: eliminate or reduce any subtle discrimination that may exist in the early 
stages of the juvenile process. 
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 Though previous research on how gender influences sanctioning strategy 
allocation is scarce, inconsistent, and out-of-date, there are studies that examine the 
impact of bias against females in the juvenile justice system.   Some research has 
supported a traditional sex-role perspective that suggests that juvenile justice officials 
treat females more harshly than males in an attempt to enforce stereotypical notions of 
proper female behavior and is reflective of a “protective” stance toward females on the 
part of the juvenile court.  For example, Shelden (1981) argues female offense patterns 
are in line with the view of young females being punished for violations of sex-role 
stereotypes. In addition, Chesney-Lind and Shelden (2004) suggest that female 
delinquency is a result of the "sexual scripts" within patriarchal families that make it 
more likely for females to become the victims of childhood sexual abuse. If females run 
away, the juvenile court supports the paternalistic “parens patriae” doctrine and returns 
the female to the parent. Continual violations lead to incarceration and a future laced with 
delinquency and criminal behavior. 
 Other studies find that males commit more offenses than females, and that male 
offenses are more serious than those of females.   For example, the American Bar 
Association and the National Bar Association (2001) used detention data to examine the 
increase in both the number and percentage of girls in the juvenile justice system.  
Approximately one-half of the girls in secure detention in the United States were arrested 
for shoplifting and running away from home.   The American Bar Association and the 
National Bar Association suggest the rise in female delinquency is attributed to the 
relabeling of girl’s family conflicts as violent offenses, changes in police practices 
regarding domestic violence and aggressive behavior, the gender bias in the processing of 
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 misdemeanor cases, and possibly a problem with handling the unique dilemmas 
perplexing the females of today.   
There are also other studies such as Bloom, et al. (2002) that claim to have found 
evidence of female offenders receiving both more lenient and more severe outcomes 
depending on the offense than males.  Bloom stated that more attention is being placed on 
female offenders because they are one of the fastest growing segments of the juvenile 
justice system.    Bloom noted that that the type of confinement for females varies with 
offense type and severity.  While females account for 47% of the juveniles confined for 
status offenses, they are less likely to be held in a residential facility for a violent index 
crime (females 13% to males 27%) or property index crime (females 19% to 27%).  Plus, 
females committing a person offense are more likely to end up in public facilities (29%) 
than private facilities (19%). 
Although numerous studies have made comparisons of the differences in the 
white female or male juvenile, most have ignored the African-American female juvenile 
offender.  As a result, most of the literature on African-American females is fragmented, 
unfocused, or lacking statistical information.  For these reasons, more attention should be 
placed on understanding the delinquent behavior of young women of color. 
Racial differences and female differences were raised in a study by Miller (1996). 
Miller argues African American females have not benefited from any preferential 
treatment in the juvenile system because they are the potential recipients of both sexism 
and racism.    Miller cites data comparing white females to African American females, 
showing white females receive more lenient outcomes than Black females. Miller also 
notes higher rates of violent offenses for African-American females.   Miller concluded 
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 that probation officers adhered to “racialized gender expectations” in which the behavior 
of African American girls was seen as a result of inappropriate lifestyle choices, whereas 
the behavior of white girls was more often viewed as a manifestation of low self-esteem. 
Very little research has been completed which develops a list of factors that might 
influence the sanction strategy issued.   For example, Cohen and Klugel (1978) address 
the effects of extralegal factors such as race, gender, and social class on the detention 
decision. They assert the detention decision is controversial because many juvenile court 
statutes which define the criteria on which these decisions are based are vaguely worded.    
Cohen and Klugel found no evidence of racial discrimination on dispositional decisions 
after the effect of relevant legal variables were taken into account. Also, there is literature 
focusing on females and juveniles of color not experiencing preferential treatment in 
allocation of alternative sanctions. In general, females are detained in public detention 
centers for different and less serious offenses than boys. 
 Brian K. Payne (2002) examined the way different types of offenders respond to 
the experience of being placed under house arrest with electronic monitoring.   Payne 
found that although there were a few subtle differences in the adaptation to house arrest 
with electronic monitoring, the experience was relatively equal among various groups.  
Gender, race, age, and length of time on electronic monitoring moderately influence 
various perceptions and experiences.  The results of this study suggest that female 
offenders may experience more shame from wearing the bracelet than male offenders do, 
and electronic monitoring affects women’s work schedules.  African-American offenders 
found electronic monitoring more restrictive than white offenders.  Payne also concluded 
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 that the longer the sentence, the more likely the offender will violate their conditions of 
probation.    
Ginger Martin (2003) discusses the effectiveness of community-based sanctions 
used by community corrections in the United States.  Martin notes that correctional 
system decision makers often feel compelled to increase their use of community-based 
sanctions because they are less expensive.  Martin concluded community based sanctions 
may not be effective in reducing recidivism, punishing offenders for lawbreaking, and 
preventing them from causing harm to the community.   
Research concerning race and gender bias in juvenile decision making has 
produced inconsistent findings.  Wu (1997) brought attention to previous studies of case-
handling bias at various stages of juvenile justice processing that produced inconsistent 
results attributed to methodological problems.  Wu attempted to resolve this by utilizing a 
multi-staged design, adequate control of several key legal and extra-legal variables, and 
refined measures of key social variables. He examined the effects of race on the three 
stages of juvenile justice processing: detention, adjudication and disposition.  Data were 
obtained from 2,334 court cases randomly sampled from 17 Ohio counties.    Wu 
concludes that differential treatment of minorities is at the detention stage.  Further, when 
differential treatment occurs, it can have a lasting effect at the later decision points. 
Tittle and Curran (1988) reviewed 35 studies conducted since 1967 of juvenile 
court decision making for contingencies under which discrimination is more or less likely 
to occur. Eight studies showed an association between severity of disposition and “social 
disadvantage” variables.  Five of the studies controlled on legal variables and showed 9 
discriminatory patterns.  The results suggest that differential sanctioning depends on 
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 whether the individual is a member of an aggregate that poses a threat to the elite.  The 
threats are a result of symbolic, social-psychological factors wherein white adults react to 
demeanor often stereotypically associated with nonwhites.  Thus, theoretical 
development about differential sanctioning will require de-emphasis on the ability of 
individuals to resist power and strengthened focus on the contingencies under which 
power is yielded. 
Steffensmeier et al. (1998) employed a “focal concerns” approach that 
incorporated assessments about blameworthiness, protection of the community, and 
organizational considerations and constraints with interpretations of attribution theory to 
examine the effects of being young, African American, and male on adult case 
processing.  The quantitative results indicated that age, race, and gender each had 
significant independent, but also interactive, effects on sentencing.  Young African-
American males received more severe sentences than any other age, race, or gender 
combination.  Through qualitative interviews, Steffensmeier et al. confirmed the 
contention that decision-makers stereotyped young African American males as dangerous 
and unsuitable for release into society. 
Bishop and Frazier (1996) found race to be a predictor of dispositions even after 
controlling for relevant legal variables such as prior record, offense seriousness, offense 
type.  Bishop and Frasier found that African American females were detained at a rate 
that was about the same as African American males, whereas white females were less 
likely to be detained than the African American males and females and white males.  
African-Americans received harsher dispositions than comparable whites due to the 
possible perceptions and expectations of the court officials. 
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 In the application of radical-conflict theory to this study of race and gender 
discrimination, court officials use independent variables like race, gender, age, and 
offense category as perceived behavioral and social characteristics to directly or 
indirectly sanction juvenile offenders to electronic monitoring and juvenile detention.    
With these specific variables, radical conflict theory would be adapted to read: Radical-
conflict theory suggests that juveniles who are nonwhite and/or female will receive 
detention in order to make sure they are under the court’s control and they will later 
support the political motives of the court.  African-Americans and other minorities are 
perceived as populations that threaten the social and economic environment of those in 
power.  The court officials use the sanction strategy as a tool of the juvenile justice 
system to support the status quo and control through the L. Robert Rivarde Detention 
Center run by and for the elite. Perhaps, court officials may punish minority offenders 
more severely than whites because they characterize minorities as more threatening. As a 
result of their demographic profiles and inequality, radical conflict theory would suggest 
African-Americans and other minorities are more susceptible to a severe sanctioning 
strategy. 
Research Questions & Hypotheses 
This study will address this question: Is there race or gender discrimination in 
allocation of juvenile offenders to electronic monitoring or detention?   The comparison 
of juvenile offenders sanctioned to electronic monitoring with juvenile offenders in 
detention is directed toward determining if extralegal factors such as race and/or gender 
or legal factors such as current offense influence the sanction decision.  Thus the two 
competing hypotheses are: H1: The major predictors of sanction strategy allocated are 
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 race and gender not type of offense.  African-American males and other non-white 
minorities (including females) are more likely to receive detention than Caucasian males.   
H2:  Type of offense will be a better predictor of the sanctioning strategy.   The more 
serious offense the stiffer the sanctioning strategy allocated.  Juvenile probationers who 
commit index crimes against property and index crimes against persons are more likely to 
be sanctioned to detention, whereas juvenile probationers who commit nonindex crimes 
are more likely to receive electronic monitoring. These hypotheses are based on prior 
literature and studies on juvenile offenders. 
Quantitative data with a sample of 240 post-adjudicated juvenile probationers 
sanctioned to electronic monitoring or detention will be used to answer the research 
question. Discriminant analysis will be utilized to describe and explain the variables that 
exist in the lives of the juveniles in the study. The methods of analysis will include the 
means and standard deviations of the predictor variables within sanction strategies, 
ANOVA assessing differences among the six predictor variables for the two sanctioning 
strategies, covariance matrices for the two sanctioning strategies, a test of equality of the 
within-group covariance matrices, Eigenvalues, Wilks’ Lambda, Group Centroids, Group 
classification, and Kappa.   
Background of the Juvenile Justice System 
The establishment of the first juvenile court in Cook County in 1899 marked an 
innovative idea for the treatment and rehabilitation of juveniles involved in delinquency.   
The juvenile court was a conceptual change in the nature of the child’s conduct, the 
child’s responsibility for its conduct, and the state’s role in dealing with the conduct. 
Although the goal of the juvenile court is to create a benevolent, protective, non-
 22
 adversary relationship between the child and state, it has denied children procedural 
rights.  The juvenile court’s ideology reflects the “best interests of the child and society” 
(Cavender and Knepper 1990). 
Currently, far more juvenile offenders are dispositioned to probation or released 
informally without any legal punishment than are institutionalized. Lundman (2001) 
states that approximately 50 percent of the adolescents adjudicated delinquent by the 
juvenile court are sentenced to probation. The purpose of juvenile probation is to 
safeguard the community from delinquency, to enforce accountability for offenses 
committed, and to equip juvenile offenders with the required proficiency to live 
productively and responsibly in the community.  Juvenile probation allows the juvenile to 
remain in the community and prevents stigmatization. When the child is not believed to 
be harmful to others, he or she is placed under the supervision of an officer of the 
juvenile court for purposes of rehabilitation.     
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 Chapter 2 
Methodology  
Setting 
The Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court was established in 1959.  The Jefferson 
Parish Juvenile Court’s mandate is to hear and judge proceedings affecting juveniles who 
reside in, or are found in Jefferson Parish, who are alleged delinquent, family in need of 
supervision, or in need of care.  It is also responsible for cases involving criminal neglect, 
adoptions and custody.           
The Department of Juvenile Services is an “agency” which provides services to 
both delinquent and status offenders age 10 through 16 who reside in or are found in 
Jefferson Parish.  The services include physical custody and control while an offender, 
who should not be on the streets, is awaiting trial; evaluation and diagnosis of possible 
contributive factors to the illegal behavior; recommendations of treatment plans or 
incarceration to the Juvenile Court judges in an effort to correct illegal behavior; 
provision of some resources to carry out those plans; supervision of probation of 
management of offenders during the period of treatment or until 17; and to insure that the 
juvenile offender is afforded all legal rights throughout the entire process. 
The Probation Division provides several important services to the juvenile court: 
conducting pre-dispositional investigations for the Juvenile Court on adjudicated 
juveniles; making recommendations to the Court at dispositional hearings and 
supervising juveniles placed on probation, and staffing and supervising the following 
specialized programs:  Informal FINS Program, Pre-Trial Services/Supervision Program, 
Electronic Monitoring Program, Restitutions/Community Service Work Program, 
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 Intensive Supervision Program, Correctional Options Program (COP), The Day 
Reporting Center, After-School Tutorial Program, Drug Test/Screening Program, and 
Family Harmony Workshop, and Volunteer Services, and Job Placements. 
   In 2003, The Jefferson Parish Department of Juvenile Services Probation 
Division adjudicated a total of 816 new probation cases.  Of the 816 new cases received 
for supervision, 134 were felony cases, 369 were misdemeanor offenses, and 313 were 
formal Family In Need of Services cases.   Two of this probation program’s specialized 
programs utilized in the study are: electronic monitoring and detention, both of which are 
sanctioning strategies.         
 The Electronic Monitoring Program began in September of 1989. Electronic 
monitoring places the juvenile probation office in a non-traditional setting using a home-
based central computer and numerous wristlets/verifiers which are attached to the 
offender’s wrist/ankle. The system features a Radio Frequency signal for continuous 
monitoring with automatic violations callback alerting officials if the offender leaves his 
or her place of confinement.    The main goal of Electronic Monitoring Program is to 
reduce the number of juvenile offenders held in secure detention by providing an 
alternative to secure detention for non-violent pre and post adjudicated offenders.  
Juveniles are court-ordered to participate in the Electronic Monitoring Program.   The 
electronic monitoring program is staffed by two probation officers and serves as an 
intermediate sanction in the department’s progressive sanction ladder.    
  The Electronic Monitoring Program handled a total of 808 new cases in 2003 
with program participants serving a total of 18,660 home detention days, with an average 
stay in the program of 51 days.    African American males accounted for 417 of all 
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 referrals, white males 160; and other males 36.  African American females accounted for 
117 of all referrals; white females 64; and other females 14.     
 The Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court can impose a sanction of secure detention for 
violent youths and chronic serious offenders to the L. Robert Rivarde Detention Center, 
“the Hilton hotel of jails,” (Walsh 1989 B1). The juvenile offender’s uniform consists of 
a blue jumpsuit with a pair of Converse All-Stars.    Plus, there is not a uniform guard.  
The juvenile offenders sanctioned to Rivarde receive meals, school instruction by 
teachers paid by the parish, medical and dental treatment, and pre-natal care if they are 
pregnant.    The detainees are allowed visitation and phone calls.   The offenders have 
access to computers, televisions, newspapers, and magazines.   Some of the juveniles 
admit that the living standards at Rivarde are as good as or better than that at home.  In a 
1989 article in the Times-Picayune a teen-age detainee described Rivarde as a “home 
with no outside.” 
As a 15-year-old boy who is accused of stabbing his father and has been in 
Rivarde previously, puts it:  
You got your bed, a TV.  They feed you good. It’s a real layout.  The only thing wrong 
with this place is you can’t go home. (Walsh 1989 B1). 
  Rivarde is a holding center for juvenile offenders who are awaiting trial and who 
have been deemed unsafe for release. Although the L. Robert Rivarde Juvenile Detention 
Center is designed to protect the community, hold youth accountable for their actions, 
and assist youth in developing skills and competencies necessary to their becoming 
responsible citizens, it has been “forced to act as a prison for youth convicted of armed 
robbery, rape and murder because the state’s juvenile detention homes that comprise the 
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 Louisiana Training Institute system are overflowing.”  It was originally intended to deter 
first-time and minor offenders from future delinquency.  “Rivarde is always filled to 
maximum capacity, and since many of the beds are occupied by state prisoners, at times 
it must turn away juveniles accused of crimes from truancy to auto theft due to a court-
ordered population limit,” (Walsh  1993 B4).        
 The Rivarde Detention Center received a total of 1,959 new cases in 2003.   The 
1,959 program participants served a total of 20, 257 detention days, with an average daily 
stay of 10.4, and average daily population of 49.    There were 723 (37%) first admits and 
1,236 previous admits. 1, 308 or 67% of the cases received were African-American, 552 
or 28% were White, and 99 or 5% were other.    1,418 or 72% of the cases were males 
and 541 or 28% were female.  
Methods  
The current study utilizes secondary analysis of existing juvenile court records. 
This is the best method available to collect the greatest amount of reliable quantitative 
data on juvenile offenders, a population too large to observe directly.    
 Data for this study were collected by court record retrieval from the Jefferson 
Parish Juvenile Services Department of Probation in Louisiana.  Selected cases were 
chosen based on the criteria that the juvenile offender was on probation and underwent 
electronic monitoring or detention for the first time over a 12-month period from January 
1, 2003- December 31, 2003.   To obtain a representative sample, 120 cases were drawn 
from the juvenile detention records and 120 cases were drawn from electronic monitoring 
records at Jefferson Parish Juvenile Probation Office.  A total of 240 cases were yielded 
from electronic monitoring and detention; however cases where electronic monitoring or 
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 detention was used for the commission of nonindex offenses were rare so these 38 cases 
were omitted from the study.         
The data set contains information about offenders who were placed on electronic 
monitoring or in detention for the first time.  All information for the variables used in this 
study was retrieved from individual case files.  The data describes accurately and 
precisely a wide variety of characteristics of sanctioned juvenile offenders and explains 
why there is potential discrimination in allocation of juveniles to sanctions.  
Ethical issues in the study 
The identities of the juvenile offenders were kept strictly confidential and records 
were kept safe and secure. All case files were noted on transcripts and data collections by 
a numeric code. Members of my thesis committee reviewed collected data.  All 
documents (data analysis, etc) related to this research were maintained in a secure 
location to ensure confidentiality and anonymity of the juvenile offender.  
Variables 
Personal demographics used as predictors are race, gender, age, current offense, 
and length of sentence.  Race will refer to the ethnicity of the juvenile offender.  Age will 
refer to the age of the offender at the time of sanctioning.  Seriousness of offense will 
refer to the general type of crime and will be subdivided into two categories: index 
crimes against person and index crimes against property. Index crimes against person will 
include: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated 
assault.  Index crimes against person will include: burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle 
theft, and arson.  Sanctions will be limited to electronic monitoring and juvenile 
detention. Disposition refers to the process by which a judge decides what should be done 
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 with a juvenile for whom guilt is established.  EMP will refer to the Electronic 
Monitoring Program. 
There are several limitations of this study.  Initially, this study will limit itself to 
collecting data on post-adjudicated juvenile probationer’s age 11-16 in electronic 
monitoring and detention.  The probability sampling procedure limits the research to 
juveniles in the probation program, thereby decreasing the generalizability of the 
findings.  The conclusions could be subject to other interpretations. 
Description of the Sample        
 Table 1 represents a description of the research sample.  The sample consisted of 
202 juvenile offenders, 154 (76.2 percent) males and 48 (23.8 percent) females.  The 
average age of the sample was 16 years, with a range of 8-16 years.  Caucasians represent 
31.2 percent (63) of the sample, while ethnic groups represent 68.8 percent (African 
Americans = 62.4 percent (126) and Other= 6.4 percent (13)) of the sample. Index crimes 
against property and index crimes against persons (n= 111, n= 91, respectively), make up 
84.2 percent of the sample.  Finally, the average length of days served is 24.4 days, with a 
range of 2-119.  
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 Table 1. Frequency Distributions of the Predictors 
 FREQUENCY (F) PERCENTAGES (%)
Race of the Offender:   
African-American 126 62.4%  
Caucasian 
 63 31.2% 
Other 13 6.4%  
Gender of the Offender:   
Male 154 76.2%  
Female 
 48 23.8% 
Age the Offender:   
8 through 13 35 17.3% 
14 48 23.8% 
15 56 27.7% 
16 63 31.2% 
Seriousness of the Offense:   
Index Crime against Person 91 45.0% 
Index Crime Against Property 111 55.0% 
Length of Sentence Served:   
1-24 122 60.4% 
25-48 54 26.7% 
49-119 26 12.9% 
 
 
The information contained in the court records utilized in the study allowed for 
determination of personal demographic characteristics on the sanction strategy allocated. 
The independent variables include race, gender, age, current offense, and length of 
sentence.  Race was coded as African-American, Caucasian, or Other which will be 
coded as 1, 2, and 3 respectively.    Gender of offender was recorded as male (1) and 
female (2).  Age was categorized as eight through 13, fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen which 
was coded as 1, 2, 3, and 4.   Length of sentence served is total days served and were 
collapsed into three categories: 1-24 days coded as 1, 25-48 days coded as 2, and 49 to 
119 days coded as 3.   The seriousness of offense category was based on the Federal 
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 Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Report’s two general types of index crimes and 
nonindex offenses.         
The dependent variable is the sanction strategy imposed. Sanction strategies were 
recorded as electronic monitoring or detention and were coded as 1 and 2 respectively.  
Cases that were in contempt of court were not included in the study. 
Data analysis procedures 
Discriminant analysis is a procedure used to predict membership in two or more 
mutually exclusive groups from a set of predictors, when there is no natural ordering of 
the groups.  Discriminant analysis was conducted to determine whether six predictors— 
race, gender, age, and last grade completed, seriousness of offense, and length of 
sentence —could predict sanction strategy. I want to investigate which variables 
discriminate between post-adjudicated juvenile probationers placed on electronic 
monitoring or placed on detention. The juvenile offenders will fall into one of the two 
categories.  The SPSS data file contains 202 cases and 6 variables, the five predictor 
variables and the grouping variable that distinguishes among the two sanction strategies.  
Green (1999) stresses a number of preliminary statistics should be reported: the 
means and standard deviations of the predictors within sanction strategies, ANOVAs 
assessing differences among the five predictors for the two sanction strategies, covariance 
matrices for the two sanction strategies, and a test of equality of the within-group 
covariance matrices. Wilk’s Lambda, a series of chi-square significance tests, will 
assesses whether there are significant differences among groups across predictor 
variables.  The Wilk’s Lambda helped determine how many discriminant functions 
should be interpreted.  Each discriminant function was given a name by examining the 
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 strength of the standardized coefficient for the predictor variables in the function and the 
correlation coefficient between the predictor variables and the function within a group 
(coefficients in the structure matrix).  The group classification results determine how well 
we can predict group membership using a classification function. 
Results  
This study examines the personal demographics as factors that determine the 
allocation of juvenile offenders to sanction after adjudicated as delinquent. This section 
presents the results of the data analysis and discussion of the results.  First, the results 
from the crosstabulations for the personal demographic factors and sanction strategies are 
presented.  Also, results of the discriminant analysis are presented.  Then, a discussion of 
the results finalizes this section.   
Table 2 shows the results of the cross tabulation of sanction strategy by race.  The 
research hypothesis is:  African-Americans and other minorities are more likely to be 
sanctioned to detention.    Thus, African-Americans are more likely detained, whites 
more likely assigned to EMP.  The null hypothesis is:  There is no relationship between 
race and sanction strategy.  In fact, the percentages of race and ethnicity sanctioned are 
very similar.  Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that race has no relationship 
with sanction strategy served.  Lambda has a value of .010, indicating a very weak 
relationship between race and sanction strategy.   
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 Table 2.  Sanction Strategy by Race in Percentages 
SANCTION STRATEGY 
 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN CAUCASIAN OTHER TOTAL 
Electronic Monitoring 50.0% 
(63) 
52.4% 
(33) 
 
46.2% 
(6) 
 
50.5% 
(102) 
 
Detention 50.0% 
(63) 
47.6% 
(30) 
53.8% 
(7) 
49.5% 
(100) 
Total (N) 
 
100.0% 
(126) 
 
100.0% 
(63) 
100.0% 
(13) 
100.0% 
(202) 
Chi-square= 20 p>.05 Lambda= .010  Contingency Coefficient=.031 
Table 3 presents the results of the cross tabulation of sanction strategy served by 
gender.  The results suggest that there is significant evidence that males are sanctioned 
more often to electronic monitoring than females (p<.01).  57.1 percent of males and 
42.9% of females were sanctioned to electronic monitoring.  29.2 percent of males and 
70.8 percent of females were sanctioned to detention.  This supports the hypothesis that 
females are more likely than males to be sanctioned to detention.  Lambda has a value of 
.200 which indicates a weak relationship between the variables. Gender improves our 
prediction of the sanction strategy allocated by 20%. 
 
Table 3.  Sanction Strategy by Gender in Percentages 
SANCTION STRATEGY MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
Electronic Monitoring 57.1% 
(88) 
29.2% 
(14) 
 
50.5% 
(102) 
Detention 42.9% 
(66) 
70.8% 
(34) 
49.5% 
(100) 
Total  
(N) 
100.0% 
(154) 
100.0% 
(48) 
100.0% 
(202) 
Chi square= 10.366, p<.01 Lambda= .200  Contingency Coefficient=.232  
 
Table 4 presents the results of the cross tabulation of sanction strategy by age of 
offender.  There was a significant relationship between age and the sanction strategy 
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 served.  For instance, 71.4% of the juveniles aged 13 and under were placed on detention; 
the younger the offender the less likely they were represented on either sanctions 
strategy.  This suggests a juvenile aged 13 and under is more likely to receive detention 
as a sanction than electronic monitoring.   
 
Table 4.   Sanction Strategy by Age in Percentages 
SANCTION STRATEGY SERVED 8 THROUGH 13 14 15 16 TOTAL
Electronic Monitoring 28.6% 
(10)             
56.3% 
(27) 
53.6% 
(30) 
55.6% 
(35) 
50.0% 
(102) 
Detention 71.4% 
(25) 
43.8% 
(21) 
46.4% 
(26) 
44.4% 
(28) 
50.0% 
(100) 
Total 100.0% 
35 
100.0% 
48 
100.0% 
56 
100.0% 
63 
100.0% 
202 
Chi-square= 8.22, p<.05 Lambda= .150  Contingency coefficient= .198 
            
Table 5 shows the results of the cross-tabulation of the length of sentence served 
in percentages.  Eighty of the juvenile probationers with a sentence of 1 through 24 days 
received detention. Forty of the juvenile probationers with a sentence of 25 through 48 
days received electronic monitoring. Twenty of the juvenile probationers received a 
sentence of 49 through 119 days. There was a significant relationship of length of 
sentence served and sanction strategy allocated (p<.001).  A lambda of .380 indicates a 
moderate relationship. 
 
Table 5.   Sanction Strategy by Length of Sentence Served in Percentages 
SANCTION STRATEGY SERVED 1-24 25-48 49-119 TOTAL
Electronic Monitoring 
 
 
Detention   
 
34.4% 
(42) 
 
65.6% 
(80) 
74.1% 
(40) 
 
25.9% 
(14) 
76.9% 
(20) 
 
23.1% 
(6) 
50.5% 
(102) 
 
49.5% 
(100) 
Total 
N 
100.0% 
122 
100.0% 
54 
100.0% 
48 
100.0% 
240 
Chi-square= 31.88, p<.001 Lambda = .380  Contingency Coefficient= .369 
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 Table 6 displays the results of the cross tabulation of sanction strategy by offense 
category in percentages.  It was hypothesized that category of offense would influence 
sanction strategy.  This hypothesis was supported (p= .035).   A lambda value of .15 
indicates a weak relationship. 
 
Table 6.  Sanction Strategy by Seriousness of Offense in Percentages 
SANCTION STRATEGY 
SERVED 
INDEX CRIME AGAINST 
PERSON 
INDEX CRIME AGAINST 
PROPERTY 
TOTAL
Electronic Monitoring 
 
 
Detention   
 
41.8% 
(38) 
 
58.2% 
(53) 
57.7% 
(64) 
 
42.3% 
(47) 
50.5% 
(102) 
 
49.5% 
(100) 
Total 
N 
100.0% 
91 
100.0% 
111 
100.0% 
202 
Chi-square 4.441, p< .05 Lambda= .150  Contingency Coefficient= .156 
 
Table 7.  Summary Table of the Crosstabs 
VARIABLE NAME LAMBDA CONTIGENCY 
COEFFICIENT 
SIGNIFICANCE 
Race .01 .031 p>.05 
Gender .200 .250 p<.01 
Age .150 .198 p<.05 
Seriousness of Offense .150 .156 p<.05 
Length of Sentence .380 .369 p< .05 
 
Of the five predictor variables, race is not significantly related to the sanction 
decision while gender, age, type of offense, and length of sentence are.  Of the four 
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 significant variables, length of sentence is really an outcome of the type of sentence, thus 
it would be expected to have the strongest relationship with the sanctioning strategy.  Of 
the remaining three variables, one is a legal variable-type of offense which indicates the 
seriousness of offense, and two are extralegal variables.  It is interesting that the two 
extralegal variables are more strongly related to the sanction decision than is the legal 
variable; hence the adolescent’s age and gender have more effect on the sanction 
allocated than does the seriousness of offense.  Moreover, gender has the strongest 
relationship on the sanction type of the true independent variables since it explains 20 
percent of the variability in sanction strategy while age and offense seriousness explain 
only 15 percent each.  Thus, the results thus far suggest that there is gender, but not racial 
discrimination in the sentencing of these adolescents. 
Tables 8 through 12 summarize the results of the discriminant analysis for 
predicting sanctioning strategy allocated. In Table 8, the preliminary statistics of 
discriminant analysis are presented.  The table consists of the means and standard 
deviations of the predictors within sanction strategies, ANOVAs assessing differences 
among the six predictors for the two sanctioning strategies, and a test of equality of the 
within-group covariance matrices. The preliminary statistics did not indicate significant 
differences among the two sanction strategies (p-values range from .00 to .862).  Also, 
there were significant differences in the covariance matrices among the two sanction 
strategies (p-value of .000 for the Box’s M test).    The covariances appear to differ across 
groups. 
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 Table 8.1 Preliminary Statistics of Discriminant Analysis. 
Group Statistics for All Variables without Missing Data (N= 202)  
SANCTIONING STRATEGY 
SERVED 
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
Electronic Monitoring Race  
Gender 
Age 
Sentence Length 
Seriousness of 
Offense 
1.4412 
.1373 
2.8824 
1.7843 
1.6275 
.60646 
.34582 
.99796 
.75291 
.48587 
Detention Race  
Gender 
Age 
Sentence Length 
Seriousness of 
Offense 
1.4400 
.3400 
2.5700 
1.2600 
1.4700 
.62474 
.47610 
1.14816 
.56174 
.50161 
Total Race  
Gender 
Age 
Sentence Length 
Seriousness of 
Offense 
.2376 
2.7277 
1.5248 
24.2184 
1.5495 
.61900 
.41084 
1.29291 
19.88542 
.68916 
 
 
Table 8.2 Tests of Equality of Group Means  
VARIABLE 
NAME 
WILKS’ 
LAMBDA 
F DF1 DF2 SIG 
Race 
Gender 
Age 
 
Length of 
Sentence 
Served 
 
Seriousness of 
Offense 
 
 
1.000 
 
.953 
 
.977 
 
 
 
.867 
 
 
 
.998 
 
 
.030 
 
10.063 
 
4.862 
 
 
 
31.177 
 
 
 
.492 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
204 
 
204 
 
204 
 
 
 
204 
 
 
 
204 
 
.862 
 
.002 
 
.029 
 
 
 
.000 
 
 
 
.484 
 
 In Table 8.2 the results of univariate ANOVAs, carried out for each independent 
variable are presented. Gender, age, and length of sentence served differ (sig = .002, .029, 
and .000) for the two groups (electronic monitoring and detention). 
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Table 8.3 Test Results  
BOX’S M  57.891 
F Approx 
df1 
df2 
Sig. 
2.670 
21 
151117.6 
.000 
 
  
Table 8.3 displays the results of the test of equality of the within-group covariance 
matrices. Box M tests the null hypothesis that the covariance matrices will not differ 
between groups formed by the dependent.  The test was significant.  Based on Box M, we 
conclude the sanction strategies do differ in their covariance matrices. 
 
Table 9. Significance Tests and Strength-of-Relationships 
Eigenvalues 
FUNCTION EIGENVALUE PERCENT OF 
VARIANCE 
CUMULATIVE 
PERCENT 
CANONICAL 
CORRELATION
1 .196 100.0 100.0 .405 
The canonical correlation of .405 is moderate. 
 
 
Wilks’ Lambda 
TEST OF FUNCTION WILKS’ 
LAMBDA 
CHI-SQUARE DF SIG. 
1 .836 35.9577 6 .000 
 
The results for significance tests and strength-of-relationship statistics are shown 
in Table 9.  In the first box labeled Eigenvalue, the discriminant function has an 
Eigenvalue of .196 and a canonical correlation of .405.  By squaring the canonical 
correlation for the discriminant function (.4052= .164), the eta square was obtained.  
Accordingly 16%, of the variability among the two sanction strategies is accounted for by 
differences among the personal demographic variables.  The Wilks’ lambda, which is a 
series of chi-square significance tests, assessed whether there are significant differences 
among groups across the predictor variables, after removing the effects of any previous 
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 discriminant functions. The overall Wilks’ lambda was significant, Lambda = .84, x2 (5, 
N = 202) = 35.957, p < .001, indicating that there are differences among sanction 
strategies across the five predictor variables in the population.  Based on the ANOVA 
table, we may consider eliminating race and offense from the model. 
 
Table 10. Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients 
VARIABLES FUNCTION 
1 
Race of the Offender 
Gender of the Offender 
Age at Sanctioning 
Last Grade Completed 
Length of Sentence Served 
Seriousness of Offense 
-.028 
-.321 
.201 
.115 
.812 
.102 
  
Table 10 Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients displays the 
unstandardized scores which show the importance of independent variables in predicting 
the dependent. Race of the offender’s discriminant score is -.028.  Gender’s discriminant 
score is -.321.  Age at sanctioning discriminant score is .201.  Length of sentence 
discriminant score is .812.  The offense categories discriminant score is .102.  Again, 
gender has more effect in sentence strategy than does age and both gender and age have 
more influences than seriousness of the offense. 
 
Table 11. Group Centroids 
Functions at Group Centroids 
SANCTION STRATEGY SERVED FUNCTION 
1 
Electronic Monitoring .458 
Detention -.428 
  
Group Centroids are displayed in Table 11.  The values labeled group centroids 
are the mean values on the discriminant functions for the two sanction strategies.  Based 
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 on the discriminant function, electronic monitoring had the highest mean (mean=. 46), 
while detention had the lowest mean (mean = -.428).   
 
Table 12. Group Classification** 
   PREDICTED 
GROUP 
MEMBERSHIP 
  
  Sanction 
strategy served 
EMP Detention Total 
Original Count EMP 
 
 Detention 
66 
 
26 
33 
 
81 
99 
 
107 
Original Percent EMP 
 
Detention 
66.7 
 
24.3 
33.3 
 
75.7 
100.0 
 
100.0 
*Cross-
Validated 
Count EMP 
               
Detention 
62 
 
30 
37 
 
77 
99 
 
107 
*Cross-
Validated 
Percent EMP 
 
Detention 
62.6 
 
28.0 
32.4 
 
72.0 
100.0 
 
100.0 
*Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis.  **71.4% of original grouped cases correctly 
classified.  67.5% of cross-validated group cases correctly classified. 
 
 
Table 12 shows the within-group correlations and the standardized weights which 
determine how well the classification function predicts group membership.  The section 
of the table labeled original indicates how well the classification function predicts in the 
sample.  Correctly classified cases appear on the diagonal of the classification table. 
Of the 99 cases in the electronic monitoring group, 66 (67%) were predicted correctly.  In 
the detention group, 81 of 107 cases (75.7%) were classified correctly.   Overall 71 
percent of the cases were correctly classified. 
The cross-validated section of the table indicates how the classification functions 
are derived based all cases except one and the left out case is excluded.   The cross-
validated table estimates how well the classification functions derived on all N cases 
could predict with a new sample.  The cross-validated table shows 62 of the offenders 
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 sanctioned to electronic monitoring and 77 of the offenders sanctioned to detention were 
correctly classified.   Of 206 cases, the overall number of cases correctly classified was 
68 percent of the sample. 
A discriminant analysis was conducted to determine whether juvenile offenders 
would be sanctioned to electronic monitoring or detention based on their race, gender, 
age, length of sentence served, and seriousness of offense. The model includes all of the 
variables in the study and excludes cases with missing variable data (n=203).   The 
analysis identified gender of the juvenile offender, age at sanctioning, seriousness of 
offense, and length of sentence served as contributing most to the differences between 
groups. The Wilks’ lambda was significant, Lambda = .80, x2 (6, N = 202) = 44.37, p < 
.001, indicating differences on the five predictors between the two sanctioning strategies. 
Juvenile offenders were classified on the basis of the demographic factors and extralegal 
variables.    Seventy-one percent of the juvenile offenders were correctly classified as 
being placed on electronic monitoring and detention. To estimate how well the 
classification method would predict in a future samples, a leave-one-out analysis was 
conducted.  The results indicated that 69% of the juvenile offenders would be classified 
correctly. Finally, to take into account chance agreement, a kappa coefficient of .41 was 
computed indicating a moderately accurate prediction. 
Follow-up discriminant analyses were conducted to evaluate the differences 
among the predictors.  A discriminant analysis was conducted to determine whether race, 
gender, and age at sanctioning influence sanction strategy allocated.    The results show 
that gender and age are significant.  The overall Wilks’ lambda was found to be 
significant, Lambda = .927, x2 (3, N = 202) = 15.074, p < .002, indicating that overall the 
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 predictors differentiated among the two sanction strategies.  Sixty-four percent of the 
cases were correctly classified as electronic monitoring and detention. 
Another discriminant analysis was conducted to determine if the seriousness of 
offense determine the sanction strategy served.  The Box M had a value of .750.  The 
overall Wilks’ lambda was found to be significant, Lambda = .975, x2 (1, N = 202) = 
5.058, p < .025, indicating that overall the predictors differentiated among the two 
sanction strategies. Fifty-eight percent of the sample was correctly classified. Thus, 
extralegal variables are better predictors of sanctioning strategy than legal variables. 
Conclusion 
The conclusions from the study point to a number of issues concerning juvenile 
offenders being sanctioned to electronic monitoring and detention.  This study revealed 
gender, age, length of sentence, and seriousness of offense were predictors of the sanction 
strategy served.  The Jefferson Parish Department of Juvenile Services should use age, 
length of sentence, and seriousness of offense when allocating sanctioning strategies. 
It was hypothesized that African-Americans were more likely to be sanctioned to 
detention than Caucasians.  This hypothesis was not supported.   The study revealed race 
was not significant as a predictor of sanction strategy allocated.  Perhaps this is due to the 
research data under close scrutiny by federal agencies.    The results match Cohen and 
Klugel (1979) who found no evidence of racial discrimination on dispositional decisions 
after the effect of relevant legal variables were taken into account.  However, the results 
differ from Patricia Devine (1998), who found that African-Americans were significantly 
over-represented at all stages of the juvenile justice system.  A possible explanation for 
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 the race results is the “feds” are being more cautious in terms of watching race/ethnicity, 
not gender. 
Furthermore, females were 70.4 percent more likely to be placed on detention 
than males.  This result supports Chesney-Lind and Shelden (2004) and Nagal and Hanan 
(Kruttschnitt and Green 2003) argument that the sex-role stereotypes of appropriate 
behavior for males and females cause females to receive a harsher sanction strategy than 
males. Chesney-Lind and Shelden suggested that a double standard of justice operates 
through a chivalrous male justice system that seeks to “protect” young girls from their 
own sexuality. Perhaps, females are sanctioned more to detention because the juvenile 
justice system is using the sanction as an attempt to control the female offender and serve 
as a surrogate father.   Also, the court official’s class position and social position 
influence the sanction strategy allocated.  The paternalistic ideology of the juvenile 
justice system is indicated by sanction strategy issue.  Males are granted more freedom in 
terms of nonindex offenses due to the traditional male roles embedded in culture.  
Females are socialized to be more submissive.  The female offender is placed in detention 
so that she can be placed under supervision.  However, females placed in detention may 
experience more physical and sexual victimization.   In addition, males and females 
should not be sanctioned differently due to discrimination and/or patriarchy. This requires 
further research in order to identify why females are more frequently sanctioned to 
detention than are males in the juvenile justice system.  It should be noted that gender 
was not significantly related to seriousness of the offense; almost identical percentages of 
males and females committed each type of offense.  Thus, the decision to sanction 
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 females to detention cannot be due to the seriousness of the offense committed nor can it 
be due to prior offenses since these are all first time offenders. 
For age, juveniles under 13 years of age were more likely to be sanctioned to 
detention.  Possibly, younger juveniles are sanctioned to detention as a mechanism to 
prevent them from future offending.    Also, as offenders age they commit less offenses.  
The age of the offender requires more research to determine why the result occurred and 
how younger juveniles are sanctioned to electronic monitoring or detention.  Age, like 
gender, was not significantly related to the seriousness of the offense; therefore, 
seriousness of the offense cannot be used to explain why younger adolescents are more 
likely to receive the more severe sanction. 
Seriousness of offense was not as predictive of the sanction strategy allocated.  
This was contrary to the idea that seriousness of offense would be the most predictive of 
the sanction strategy.  Perhaps, this was due to the more serious offenders issued 
electronic monitoring and detention.  Also, this may be attributed to many of the 
nonindex offenders are issued Diversion. 
Length of sentence served was predictive of the sanction strategy allocated.    
Juveniles who are sanctioned longer are more likely to receive electronic monitoring.  
Detention is meant to be short, but intense for lasting effect.  This was suggested by the 
literature.   
In conclusion, the results regarding gender differences in the sanctioning strategy 
decision offers support for the argument that due to stereotypical perceptions on the part 
of decision makers, females as a group may be viewed as more delinquent, and may 
receive differential treatment than their white male counterparts.  The findings illustrate 
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 female offenders are sanctioned much more harshly than male offenders.  The gender 
differences in sanctioning were observed more in detention than electronic monitoring.    
The study suggests that female offenders receive detention because of the inherent 
patriarchy of the juvenile justice system and sex-role stereotypes. 
Weaknesses of the Study 
A review of the literature, the theoretical framework, and the data collection 
reveals several areas for improving the allocation of sanctioning strategies to juvenile 
offenders.  The results of this study indicate that gender bias in the juvenile justice system 
should be addressed. There are several weaknesses that plagued the research study, the 
most important being the sample, followed by the missing data, absence of a family 
variable, and the assumptions of the discriminant  analysis not being met.  First, the 
sample was taken solely from Jefferson Parish.  Possibly, if the sample were statewide, 
different results would have been yielded.   Consequently, the results may have been 
more generalizable. Second, the data collected included several variables in which data 
were not present in the files and, thus, not recorded.  This suggests a need for better 
record keeping and case management.  Also, the Department of Juvenile Services should 
attempt to obtain information about the offender’s family before sanctioning the offender 
to electronic monitoring or detention, because family information may be vital in 
conjunction with gender of the offender. Perhaps, if all the data was present, a more vivid 
portrait of the sanctioning allocations may have been possible.  Lastly, the results in the 
Box M were significant.         
 Future research could explore the perception of court officials, including how 
both racial/ethnic and gender bias may influence sanction strategy issued.     Also, a study 
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 can be done to find the integration effects of gender and the family.  Furthermore, it is 
essential to consider the social and cultural context that contributes to the juvenile 
offender’s life in order to understand their delinquency.  Thus, the need for an inclusive 
theory of delinquency that addresses the juvenile offender who experiences 
marginalization and oppression in Western culture is evident. 
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 Appendices 
Appendix A. Copy of the Data Sheet Provided by the Jefferson Parish Juvenile Services 
Electronic Monitoring Program 
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 Appendix B. Copy of the Data Sheet Provided by the Jefferson Parish Juvenile Services 
Rivarde Detention Center 
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 Appendix C. Copy of the SPSS File Created from the Data 
Sheet.
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